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C

onsistent and well-designed frameworks for
ethical oversight enable socially valuable
research while forestalling harmful or poorly
designed studies. I suggest some alterations that
might strengthen the valuable checklist Rattani and
Hyder propose in this issue of Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics1 for the ethical review of health policy
and systems research (HPSR), or prompt future work
in the area.

Institutional Versus Individual Interventions
Rattani and Hyder describe HPSR as “investigation,
evaluation, and/or implementation of healthcare
strategies or issues at the institutional or systemslevel.”2 But their case study involves an individuallevel intervention — a conditional cash transfer — for
which individual informed consent was obtained, just
as in traditional clinical research. In contrast, much
HPSR involves changes to institutional rules or policies, such as changes to health system budgets, staffing,
or supply chains, where individual consent is infeasible. More detail about how the checklist applies to
institutional HPSR, and who should review it, would
strengthen the project. It is not obvious that research
ethics committees should review institutional-level
HPSR,3 and current law in the United States exempts
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some types of HPSR — such as research on the design
of benefit programs — from research ethics committee
review, though not from review altogether.4
The distinction between individual and institutional
HPSR might also help clarify the proper role of gatekeepers. When individual consent is feasible, respect
for autonomy supports a presumption in favor of leaving enrollment decisions in the hands of potential participants, not gatekeepers. By contrast, the infeasibility of individual consent for institutional HPSR makes
representatives more relevant. Yet identifying legitimate representatives is challenging. If institutional
HPSR is proposed for a political jurisdiction, politically legitimate representatives are appropriate gatekeepers. But in the absence of recognized structures of
representation, authorizing informal representatives
to approve or veto studies presents complexities.5

Incentives, Harm, and Undue Inﬂuence
Rattani and Hyder suggest that “the use of incentives
creates a unique risk for harm, especially in LMICs,
where the socioeconomic effects of poverty may inappropriately influence participation.”6 Incentives to
participate in a risky study could in principle produce
undue influence by leading participants to misjudge
risks, though the reality of that danger is empirically
uncertain.7 But harm from undue influence requires
that the underlying intervention be risky: incentives
cannot make a low-risk intervention into a high-risk
one. Meanwhile, though incentives may activate financial motivations, financial motivations do not make
participation inappropriate.8 I worry that the checklist’s concerns about incentives may amplify existing
misconceptions among research ethics committees
that incentives undermine autonomy9 and motivate
disproportionate scrutiny of incentive-based research.
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It is doubtful that providing an intervention without
consent — as institutional-level HPSR often involves
— raises fewer concerns than incentivizing its use.
Further, the same “incentives that expand a participant’s range of opportunities” may also “entice participants to undergo risks they would not otherwise”10: an
incentive can expand opportunity while leading participants to assume risks. This is recognized outside
research: “in the realm of work it is ethically permissible and not undue influence to offer money as an
incentive to get people to perform activities that they
would otherwise not.”11 Likewise, workers can accept
time-limited incentives (like bonuses) without being
harmed by their temporary receipt. This calls into

REC review on HPSR, or imposing more stringent
duties of justice on researchers than non-researchers,
creates counterproductive incentives to implement
policy changes without research.12 Clarifying which
aspects of the checklist entail mandates as opposed to
encouragement could help address this concern. Consent when practicable and not waived (II(2a)), and a
reasonable balance of risk and benefit (VII(6)), should
be mandatory. By contrast, other aspects of the checklist, such as the details of community engagement and
research translation, support encouragement but not
mandates.
Excessively aspirational mandates risk either
obstructing valuable research or prompting concep-

The “principlist” (autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice) framework
familiar in clinical ethics is used to ground the checklist. This framework
fits uneasily with research ethics, especially the systems-level ethical issues
HPSR presents. For instance, Rattani and Hyder find themselves driven to
transmute principlist respect for autonomy to a nonspecific principle
of respect. Similarly, it is not clear that beneficence and nonmaleficence
should be understood as distinct principles, or separate from justice,
in research. Rattani and Hyder understand justice to include improving
the well-being of the worst off, which seems like a species of beneficence.
Grounding the checklist in ethical frameworks more commonly used
in research ethics, and/or frameworks used in public health or
population-level bioethics, might enhance the ethical review of HPSR.
doubt the suggestion that consensual provision of
temporary incentives in research is harmful.

Avoiding Research Exceptionalism and
Overbroad Mandates
Many HPSR interventions, including conditional cash
transfers, could be implemented outside research —
either by governments or by employers and philanthropists — without research ethics committee review,
and often even without consent. This distinguishes
many HPSR interventions from investigational treatments, for which consent is required even outside
research. And it raises an important question about
research exceptionalism: why should providing an
intervention via HPSR prompt greater ethical review
than simply implementing the intervention without
research?
While the checklist’s goal of improving consistency
in HPSR review is laudable, imposing clinical-style
124

tual contortions from research ethics committees and
researchers. For instance, while global health research
as an enterprise should promote health equity and
the interests of the worst off, each HPSR study in a
LMIC need not necessarily to realize those goals.
Many low- and middle-income countries are large and
economically diverse, and mandating that all HPSR
in low- and middle-income countries achieve global
justice goals will incentivize overbroad definitions of
equity and poverty. It would be better to recognize that
just as some HPSR in Boston that neither serves nor
harms global justice is acceptable, so is some similar
research in Bangalore. Similarly, mandating equipoise
in HPSR, as opposed to a reasonable risk/benefit balance, seems dubious given the contested status of
equipoise even in medical research.13
Mandating “[e]quality in the distribution of power
to make decisions, object, or modify various aspects of
the study … between researchers and communities”14
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likewise presents concerns. The researcher-community relationship better fits a separation-of-powers
model than equal, coextensive power. Typically, participants (whether groups or individuals) have decisive — not merely equal — power to decide whether to
enroll or withdraw. But they do not have equal power
to modify the design of ongoing studies, and permitting such modification without careful planning can
erode the social value and scientific validity needed
for research to be ethical. Research ethics should consider how to ensure fairness and prevent harm under
conditions of unequal power, rather than imposing
a requirement of equal power as a precondition to
research.

Selecting the Best Ethical Framework
The “principlist” (autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice) framework familiar in clinical ethics
is used to ground the checklist.15 This framework fits
uneasily with research ethics, especially the systemslevel ethical issues HPSR presents. For instance, Rattani and Hyder find themselves driven to transmute
principlist respect for autonomy to a nonspecific principle of respect. Similarly, it is not clear that beneficence and nonmaleficence should be understood
as distinct principles,16 or separate from justice, in
research. Rattani and Hyder understand justice to
include improving the well-being of the worst off,
which seems like a species of beneficence. Grounding
the checklist in ethical frameworks more commonly
used in research ethics,17 and/or frameworks used in
public health or population-level bioethics, 18 might
enhance the ethical review of HPSR.
Note
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